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COVERED BONDS: SHELTER FROM FINANCIAL
TURMOIL, EXPOSURE TO THE 1940 ACT
Steve Flantsbaum ∗
INTRODUCTION
The current credit crisis, a consequence of business and consumer
deleveraging, has raised financial stability concerns for many major
national and regional banks. 1 Falling home prices, soaring mortgage
defaults and an exorbitant rise in the LIBOR 2 – the lending rate banks
use as a benchmark to loan money – have recently made it impossible
for many homeowners to refinance their mortgages to affordable levels. 3
Though the Federal Reserve took drastic action to lower the lending and
mortgage rates, 4 many homeowners whose mortgage obligations exceeded the value of their homes simply chose to not pay their mortgages,
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1. Renzo G. Avesani et al., The Use of Mortgage Covered Bonds 3 (IMF Working
Paper No. 07/20, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=961094.
2. LIBOR stands for the London Interbank Offered Rate. http://www.investopedia
.com/terms/l/libor.asp.
3. See Deborah Levine, BOND REPORT: Covered Bonds Offer Hope for
Sustainable Housing Market, MARKETWATCH, Aug. 7, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.
com/news/story/covered-bonds-offer-hope-sustainable/story.aspx?guid=%7B98C3F5C3
%2DAA18%2D4971%2DB30E%2D3F059EC644E7%7D&dist=msr_12.
4. Jon Hilsenrath, Fed Cuts Rates Near Zero to Battle Slump, WALL ST. J., Dec.
17, 2008, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122945283457211111.
html.
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to default, and to walk away. 5 This caused great uncertainty as to the
value of assets the banks have bundled up, securitized and sold to investors. As a result, banks that decided to keep some of these assets, as
well as investors who hold many of those securitized loans in their
portfolios, suffered steep write-downs because of depressed asset market
prices. 6 Such events effectively demolished the market for securitized
mortgage bonds, and many financial institutions that had once participated in that market have exited with no indication of recommitting themselves to issuing those types of securities in the near term. 7 Moreover,
the increase in the interbank lending rate led the inversely correlated
prices of banks’ bonds to plummet. 8 This triggered the need to
recapitalize banks, which began hoarding cash and minimizing
consumer lending as they realized that their very survival was at stake
due to insufficient capitalization. 9 Analogous to a negative feedback
loop, the banks’ hoarding of cash led to further increases in overnight
lending rates, further decreases in asset prices, and further drops in
securitized debt issuances. 10
The United States Department of the Treasury (the “Treasury”), under the guidance of then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, 11 realized
that to recapitalize, financial institutions needed to provide avenues
beyond the currently dysfunctional securitization market 12 to encourage
5. See Eric Weiner, Why Not Just Walk Away from a Home, NPR, Feb. 9, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18958049.
6. Dan Levy, U.S. Foreclosures Jump 57% as Homeowners Walk Away,
BLOOMBERG, Apr. 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&
refer=home&sid=ahJfJhKyxAWI. This phenomenon has also been exacerbated by
“mark-to-market” accounting, which mandates that assets be marked down to the price
for which there exists market consensus. When there are vastly more sellers than buyers, however, the markdowns can be enormous, sometimes not reflecting the assets’
eventual recovery value.
7. See Levine, supra note 3.
8. Posting of Felix Salmon to Market Movers Blog on Portfolio.com, http://www.
portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2008/07/08/what-is-a-covered-bond (July 8,
2008, 17:08 EDT) [hereinafter Salmon Posting].
9. Mish’s Global Economic Trend Analysis, http://globaleconomicanalysis.blog
spot.com/2008/11/banks-hoard-cash-credit-card-bond-sales.html (Nov. 5, 2008, 20:26
PST).
10. Levine, supra note 3 (“Issuance of mortgage-backed debt this year through July
has dropped 83% from last year.”).
11. Henry M. Paulson, Jr.–Biography, http://www.treas.gov/education/history/secre
taries/hmpaulson.shtml (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
12. In a securitization, the originating institution pools together its interest in
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investors to buy loans from the banks’ books. Investors’ purchases of
these loans would increase asset prices and decrease mortgage rates,
which would in turn incentivize new buyers to enter the devastated real
estate market. 13 The Treasury has therefore decided that we must look
beyond the current structure of securitized lending that lets banks divest
themselves of mortgage loans. We should instead look into new issuances that help lenders make long-term loans and hold those loans on
their balance sheets. 14 One possible way to lower borrowing costs and
revive lending is to issue debt secured by collateral kept on the banks’
books. 15 This is the essential feature of a covered bond, an established
financial instrument in Europe. The Treasury specifically recommended
the establishment of a covered bond market in the U.S. with the goal of
developing it as an alternative method for banks to issue and sell mortgage loans to investors. 16
While creation of a covered bond market may alleviate stress from
dysfunctional securitization markets, issuance of covered bonds must be
complementary to business goals of investors and issuers alike. From
the investors’ standpoint, covered bonds offer recourse to the issuers’
assets, thus giving investors security in the event of default. 17 From the
issuers’ view, covered bonds attract investors – and their capital – due to
characteristics such as offering a higher credit rating and recourse to the
issuer’s assets. 18 Issuers, however, would be more reluctant to offer
covered bonds if they had to comply with an additional substantial
burden of compliance, such as that of the Investment Company Act of

financial assets with identifiable future cash flows, and sells those claims to a Special
Purpose Entity (“SPE”) whose only role is to hold those assets. Investors then purchase
these assets from the Special Purpose Entity. Therefore, the originating institution
obtains ready capital in exchange for those assets’ future cash flows. See Frank J.
Fabozzi & Vinod Kothari, Securitization: The Tool of Financial Transformation (Yale
Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 07-07, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=997079.
13. See Levine, supra note 3.
14. See Bert Ely, Op-Ed., We Need Fundamental Mortgage Reform, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 8, 2008, at A19.
15. Salmon Posting, supra note 8.
16. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BEST PRACTICES FOR RESIDENTIAL COVERED
BONDS 6 (2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/USCovered
BondBestPractices.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE].
17. See infra Parts II-III.
18. See infra Parts II-III.
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1940 (the “1940 Act”) 19 , without another avenue that would avoid such
reporting complications.
Part I of this Note describes the European covered bond market and
identifies some regulatory frameworks that allowed the covered bond to
develop there into a promising financial instrument. Part II of this Note
briefly explains recent efforts by the Treasury and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”) to cultivate a covered bond market
in the United States, focusing on the treatment of covered bond investors
in case of issuer’s default. Finally, Part III uncovers a potential obstacle
for covered bond issuers: the loss of a specific 1940 Act exemption
from “investment company” status for public offerings of structured financings, Rule 3a-7. 20 Part III then identifies an alternative way issuers
could achieve this exempted status and makes a brief recommendation
regarding the future benefit of expanding Rule 3a-7 for the sake of developing the covered bond market.
I. THE EUROPEAN COVERED BOND MARKET
A. History and Description of the European Covered Bond Market
During the last decade, the European mortgage market has expanded at an annual rate of more than 8%. 21 In order to turn mortgage loans
into available capital, European financial institutions employed covered
bonds, 22 as opposed to issuing securitized debt. 23 Several European
laws adopted specifically for covered bond issuances tremendously
helped lift that market. As a result an estimated €2.11 trillion worth of
covered bonds was outstanding as of the end of 2007. 24

19.
20.
21.

15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1940).
17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (1992).
Bond Basics: Covered Bonds (PIMCO, New York, N.Y.), DEC. 2006, at 4
[hereinafter Bond Basics], available at http://media.pimco-global.com/pdfs/pdf_uk/
Europe--Covered%20bond%20basics.pdf?WT.cg_n=PIMCO-EUROPE&WT.ti=
Europe--Covered%20bond%20basics.pdf.
22. “Covered bonds are debt instruments secured by a cover pool of mortgage
loans (property as collateral) . . . to which investors have a preferential claim in the
event of default.” European Covered Bond Council, About Covered Bonds, http://ecbc.
hypo.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=311 (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
23. TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 9 (stating that the covered
bond market dates back to over 200 years, to the initial Prussian issuance in 1770).
24. Id.
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The performance of covered bonds has been more resilient during
the credit crisis than either Asset Backed Securities (“ABS”) or Mortgage Backed Securities (“MBS”). 25 Admittedly, spreads on covered
bonds have widened sharply and declining market values of their holdings have harmed covered bond holders. 26 Indeed, sales of covered
bonds declined over five straight months 27 and global covered bond
issuance for the year through September 2008 fell 10% from the same
period in 2007. 28 That is almost insignificant, however, compared to the
same-stretch issuance of European mortgage-backed securities
(“MBS”), which plunged an enormous 96% in 2008 through September,
compared with the same period in 2007. 29 As for the erosion of market
value, although covered bonds suffered a 1.12% loss in September
2008, 30 they still outperformed investment-grade company debt, which
tumbled 3.9%. 31
The mechanics of a covered bond transaction bear great similarities
to secured financings. Essentially, covered bonds are debt instruments
secured against a pool of assets. 32 European credit institutions issuing
covered bonds use mainly long-term funding collateral, such as residential or commercial property, public sector claims and ship mortgage
loans, to support their long-term lending activities. 33 The issuing institution pledges a specific pool of collateral (the “cover pool”) to an investor
in return for capital, while the covered bond investor obtains the interest
on covered bonds, which is paid out from the issuer’s general business
25. Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Cent. Bank, Speech at the 2008
Eurofi Conference (Sept. 11, 2008).
26. See Jane Baird & Natalie Harrison, Once-Stable Covered Bond Market Dries
Up for Banks, REUTERS, Oct 1, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/FS
CONS/idUSL116536320081001.
27. See Shelley Smith, Covered Bonds Head for Their Worst Month Since 1999,
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=aV8SbAi9hkA8.
28. Mark Brown, Crisis on Wall Street: Letter from the City/News and Insights
from London’s Financial Center, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2008, at C2.
29. See id.
30. See Smith, supra note 27.
31. Id. N.B. This discussion relies on figures current through September 2008. In
the late fall and winter of 2008 and continuing through the time of publication, a
marked deterioration of the economy occurred that caused significant erosion of market
value in all types of investments.
32. See Avesani et al., supra note 1, at 4.
33. Ralf Grossmann & Otmar Stöcker, Generic Section, in EUROPEAN COVERED
BOND FACTBOOK 67 (2d ed. 2007).
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cash flows. 34 The issuing banks must keep the cover pool on their
balance sheets and the covered bond investors retain a preferred claim
against the assets in the cover pool in the event of an issuer default. 35
Therefore, the issuing institution is still responsible for losses caused by
borrowers’ defaults or delinquencies. In the event the issuing institution
fails to make payments on a covered bond, the covered bond holders are
entitled to recourse to the cover pool and, if that proves insufficient, to
the issuer’s other assets. 36 By contrast, an investor in a typical securitization only has recourse against the Special Purpose Entity (the “SPE,”
also sometimes called a Special Purpose Vehicle, or “SPV”) that issued
securitized loans, whose balance sheet typically consists strictly of those
loans. 37 Because of true sale, 38 the investor in a securitization does not
have recourse to the originating bank’s assets and so does not have a
claim against the bank if the SPE’s loan pool is insufficient to satisfy his
claim.
Covered bonds benefit investors by carrying a higher yield than
European government bonds without significantly increasing the risk
and credit quality of their portfolios. 39 Most covered bonds carry ratings
of double- or triple-A, ranking them extremely safe among corporate
debt securities. 40 To rate covered bonds so highly, all major rating agencies focus on the structure of the cover pool, including its ability to retain value in the event of issuer default and the quality of the mort34.
35.
36.
37.

See TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 7.
See id. at 11.
See id. at 7; see also Bond Basics, supra note 21, at 3.
For this and other characteristics of SPEs, see, e.g., Gary Gorton and Nicholas
S. Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, FRB Working Paper No. 05-21, 2005), available at http://knowledge.wharton
.upenn.edu/papers/1314.pdf. Without any pledged collateral behind securitized bonds,
investors have no recourse to the issuer’s assets. The SPE, which does not have any
assets aside from the assets backing the receivables themselves, also does not offer any
extra recourse. The investors are therefore left holding receivables that are not paying
in accordance to the original structure.
38. “True sale” is a legally recognized transfer of receivables from the originator to
the SPE, whereby these receivables become the legal property of the SPE and are not
affected by the originator’s bankruptcy or claims by the originator’s unsecured creditors. See Fabozzi & Kothari, supra note 12.
39. See Bond Basics, supra note 21, at 2, 5.
40. See id.; see also Frank Packer et al., The Covered Bond Market, BIS Q. REV.,
Sept. 2007, at 49-51, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0709f.pdf (discussing differences of opinion in credit ratings among credit rating agencies and for
European country-by-country data on covered bond ratings).
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gages. 41 The rating agencies are cautious, however, because even if the
cover assets retain their value, creditors of the defaulted issuer who are
not investors in its covered bonds could try to seize the assets in the cover pool to satisfy their claims. 42 To maintain the product’s credit excellence, European covered bond legislation addresses this problem by specifying that assets within the cover pool must be high quality, the cover
pool must be segregated for the benefit of covered bond holders, and investment in covered bonds must come with full recourse against the
cover pool and the issuer. 43
B. The European Covered Bond Regulatory Framework
Most European countries use similar special-law based frameworks 44 that govern issuances of covered bonds. 45 The frameworks provide guidance as to what types of assets are eligible for inclusion in the
cover pool, asset/liability management, credit enhancements and overcollateralization requirements. 46 The existence of those frameworks is
directly responsible for a liquid secondary market for covered bonds,
which makes the financial instrument even more attractive to
investors. 47 Although a special-law based framework increases market
homogeneity and simplicity, 48 some countries in Europe still prefer to
41. See, e.g., Packer et al., supra note 40, at 47; Covered Bonds, FITCH RATINGS
(Fitch Ratings, New York, N.Y.), http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/sectors/
covered_bonds/coveredbonds_factsheet.pdf (stating “[i]n order to maintain its covered
bonds ratings, Fitch Ratings receives at least quarterly reporting from issuers about their
cover pool and covered bonds, and carries out operational visits.”); see Bond Basics,
supra note 21.
42. See Packer et al., supra note 40, at 47.
43. See Bond Basics, supra note 21, at 2.
44. “A special-law based framework is a legal framework based on a law and/or
binding regulations of a public supervisory authority, specifically dedicated to regulate
a covered bond system of a country.” European Covered Bond Council, ECBC
Essential Features of Covered Bonds [hereinafter Essential Features of Covered Bonds],
http://ecbc.hypo.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=367 (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
45. Id. (“As of December 2007, special-law based frameworks exist in 26 countries
in Europe.”).
46. See Avesani et al., supra note 1, at 4-5.
47. See id.
48. See TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 9 (“Typically, a
legislative framework exists in nations with a long history of Covered Bonds while
nations with a relatively young Covered Bond market . . . have a structured framework.”).
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operate under a general-law based framework that replicates special-law
based covered bond issuances through general contract laws and
regulations of those countries. 49 What follow are certain European
frameworks, directives and regulations that facilitated covered bonds’
success.
1. The Jumbo Covered Bonds Model
The “jumbo” or “benchmark” model, first introduced in Germany
in 1995, has been the initial driver for covered bonds’ success. 50 Its influence has now expanded into other European countries. The jumbo
model added several features to a regular covered bonds issuance to increase liquidity and improve the covered bond issuance structure to suit
foreign institutional investors: 51
(1) The minimum issuance size is €1,000,000;
(2) Jumbos must be plain vanilla bonds (fixed, not variable coupon, paid annually in arrears);
(3) Buybacks are permitted;
(4) The bonds must be officially listed on an organized market;
and
(5) At least three market makers must quote bid/ask prices simultaneously to maintain a liquid market. 52
2. The UCITS Directive
After the launch of jumbo covered bonds, the covered bond market
continued to expand through the 1999 introduction of Euro-denominated
securities and the 2001 introduction of Europe’s common currency. 53
More recently, Article 22(4) of the European Directive on Undertakings
for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities 54 (the “UCITS
Directive”) has proved especially conducive to the covered bond mar49. See Essential Features of Covered Bonds, supra note 44. There is a movement
by those countries, however, to standardize their legal frameworks relating to covered
bonds to the tune of Europe’s majority. See, e.g., Avesani et al., supra note 1, at 4 n.5.
50. See Avesani et al., supra note 1, at 5; Bond Basics, supra note 21, at 4.
51. See Avesani et al., supra note 1, at 5; Bond Basics, supra note 21, at 4.
52. See Avesani et al., supra note 1, at 5.
53. Bond Basics, supra note 21, at 4-5.
54. Council Directive 2001/108, 2002 O.J. (L 41) 35 (EC); see Bond Basics, supra
note 21, at 2.
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ket’s continued growth. 55 This directive solidifies the privileged status
of covered bonds as compared to MBS or unsecured bank debt.
Article 22(4) significantly lifts investment caps by allowing investment funds and insurance companies to invest up to 25% and 40% of
their assets, respectively, as opposed to the usual 5% limit, in the covered bonds of a single issuer as long as the issuer and the bonds satisfy
the following eligibility criteria: 56
(1) The covered bonds must be issued by an EU credit institution. According to the European Covered Bond Council (the
“ECBC”), “[a] credit institution is an entity licensed to carry
on one or more banking activities, such as receiving deposits
from the public, granting loans or providing payment services” and is subject “to public supervision and regulation
which prescribes standards for the management of credit,
liquidity, interest rate and operational risks.”
(2) The covered bonds must be subject to special supervision by
the public authorities with the specific aim of protecting the
covered bond holders. The ECBC identifies the standard
features of special supervision to include: a special cover
pool monitor, periodic audits of the cover pool by the cover
pool monitor and ongoing management, and maintenance of
the cover pool upon the credit institution’s insolvency to
ensure timely payment to covered bond holders. 57 The
public authorities, which may include rating agencies, must
regularly supervise banking or capital markets activities.
These authorities should regularly monitor the underlying
cover assets and distribute that information to investors.58
(3) The sums deriving from the issuance of covered bonds must
be placed in assets which provide sufficient cover for the
liabilities deriving from the bonds until maturity. The ECBC
suggests that the value of the cover assets must be at least
equal to the value of the covered bonds. 59 Most jurisdic-

55.
56.

See Bond Basics, supra note 21, at 1-2.
Council Directive 2001/108, art. 22(4)-(5) 2002 O.J. (L 41) 35 (EC); see Bond
Basics, supra note 21, at 2.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Id.
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tions, however, either through a special-law framework, contract law or some combination of the two, also require overcollateralization, so that the value of the cover pool must
exceed the value of the covered bonds by a prescribed
amount. 60 The issuing credit institution may be required to
provide additional assets for cover if all or a portion of the
original assets mature, default or otherwise fail to meet
specified eligibility criteria, thus making the cover pool
“dynamic.” 61 Hence, there is no outright connection between a specific cover pool or individual loans and outstanding covered bonds since the cover pool’s composition
is subject to change. 62 If the cover pool is insufficient and
the issuer cannot substitute or add assets or buy back the
covered bonds, the pool accelerates and the debt obligation
pays out prior to its due date. 63
(4) The bonds under consideration must be guaranteed by the
issuer and should grant preferential rights to the bondholder
in the event of the issuer’s default. The cover assets must be
clearly identified, segregated and placed as security for the
bonds. 64 In bankruptcy proceedings, covered bond holders
have recourse against that pool of assets against which the
covered bond pool has been secured. If the pool of assets is
insufficient to cover the default as a result of non-payments
on underlying mortgage or lease payments, the investors also
have recourse against the issuer itself. 65 General, unsecured
creditors have no claim against the cover assets. 66

60.
61.

Id.
See id.; Alain Marcel & Bernd Volk, Covered Bonds: Influence of
Securitisation Techniques, in EUROPEAN COVERED BOND FACTBOOK 61 (2d ed. 2007).
62. See Marcel & Volk, supra note 62, at 61.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Vinod Kothari, The Name Is Bond. Covered Bond. (Sept. 5, 2008 rev.),
http://www.vinodkothari.com/covered%20bonds%20article%20by%20vinod%20kothar
i.pdf. However, such a lapse has not happened since the modern form of covered bonds
was adopted in 1899. American Securitization Forum Statement on U.S. Covered
Bonds, AM. SECURITIZATION FORUM, July 28, 2008, available at http://www.american
securitization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF%20Covered%20Bond%20Statement_
072808.pdf.
66. Bond Basics, supra note 21, at 3.
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3. The Capital Requirement Directive
The Capital Requirement Directive (the “CRD”) originated in a
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposal and was adopted on
June 7, 2006 to amend the supervisory regulations that direct the capital
adequacy of international banks. 67 The CRD significantly lowers risk
weighting for certain covered bond holders, enabling them to hold less
capital in reserve against the bonds. 68 It allows credit institutions
investing in covered bonds to assign a 10% risk weighting – down from
20% – to covered bonds complying with these criteria. 69 Credit institutions can take advantage of the CRD benefits if the bonds:
(1) Meet the UCITS Directive criteria, and
(2) Are backed by high-quality asset classes. 70

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COVERED BONDS IN THE UNITED STATES –
THE FDIC FINAL COVERED BOND POLICY STATEMENT AND THE
TREASURY BEST PRACTICES FOR RESIDENTIAL COVERED BONDS GUIDE
Although securitization has been the preferred method of pooling
and repackaging cash-flow producing financial assets for sale to investtors, originations of ABS, MBS, and covered bonds slowed to a trickle
during the credit crisis. 71 Some are optimistic, however, that a covered
bond framework may appeal to U.S. investors and help financial institutions recapitalize themselves through new debt issuances.72 Federal
67. See Council Directive 2006/48, 2006 O.J. (L177) 1 (EC); Council Directive
2006/49, 2006 O.J. (L177) 201 (EC).
68. See Avesani et al., supra note 1, at 6; Bond Basics, supra note 21.
69. See Avesani et al., supra note 1, at 6.
70. High-quality asset classes include commercial and residential mortgages, public sector loans, ship loans, and Senior MBS. See Bond Basics, supra note 21.
However, market participants in countries that do not have specific covered bond legislation, but instead use the general-law framework, such the U.K., expand the definition
to include bonds issued under private contractual arrangements using elements from
structured finance. See Packer et al., supra note 40, at 52.
71. See John Brinsley & Robert Schmidt, Paulson Shifts Focus of Rescue to
Consumer Lending, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 12, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601087&sid=aoD4QebIb_Fo&refer=home.
72. Kevin Warsh, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks on Covered Bond
Framework at the U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Conference on Covered Bond
Framework (July 28, 2008) [hereinafter Warsh Remarks], available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/warsh20080728a.htm.
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Reserve Governor Kevin Warsh 73 stated that covered bonds are of such
high rating and high quality that they would generally fall within the
range of eligible collateral that the Federal Reserve has long accepted
from depository institutions at its discount window. 74 Therefore,
“[p]rivate lenders also are likely to find such bonds attractive as collateral for credit extensions” in the United States. 75
To date, only two U.S. institutions have issued covered bonds:
euro-denominated sale by Washington Mutual in 2006, followed by
Bank of America’s euro-denominated and dollar-denominated sales in
2007. 76 Without a special-law framework, these issuances were done
through contractual dealings. 77 In view of the credit crisis, however, the
Treasury has taken a special interest in developing a specific covered
bond framework in the United States. The Treasury believes that such a
market will create a viable alternative to securitization while the latter
market is struggling, and will later serve as a complement to securitization when the market picks up. 78 The Treasury’s proposal has already
attracted interest and enlisted support from the country’s largest banks –

Treasury’s discussions with market participants suggest that a covered bond
framework may attract investor interest and facilitate greater access to mortgage
credit. High-quality assets might be financed if banks are allowed to manage pools of
loans, substituting new loans into the pool as others become delinquent. Newly issued
covered bonds backed by high quality mortgage loans and issued by strong financial
institutions may find a growing investor base in the United States.

Id.
73. Kevin M. Warsh–Biography, http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/
board/warsh.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
74. Warsh Remarks, supra note 73.
75. Id.
76. See Paul J. Davies, New Issues: Bank of America in Covered Bond Deal, FIN.
TIMES, Mar 28, 2007, available at http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=
fto032820071551280140; News Release, Washington Mut., WaMu Settles Groundbreaking European Covered Bond Sale (Sept. 27, 2006), available at http://newsroom.
wamu.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=189529&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=909733&highlight.
77. TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 9.
78. Id. at 5 (“Covered Bonds present an alternative source of funding for
institutions that can complement other sources of financing for a wide range of highquality assets.”); id. at 3 (“Treasury believes that Covered Bonds represent a potential
additional source of financing that could reduce borrowing costs for homeowners,
improve liquidity in the residential mortgage market, and help depository institutions
strengthen their balance sheets by diversifying their funding sources.”).
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J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup and Wells Fargo. 79
Domestic brokerages like Goldman Sachs are also directing staff and
resources to concentrate on underwriting, marketing and trading covered
bonds. 80
On July 15, 2008, the FDIC released the Final Statement of Policy
on the treatment of covered bonds (the “Policy Statement”). 81 As a supplement to the Policy Statement, the Treasury issued a Best Practices for
Residential Covered Bonds guide (the “Best Practices Guide”). 82 These
documents inform potential investors of details regarding issuances of
covered bonds and treatment of covered bond holders in an effort to promote growth of the covered bonds market in the United States. 83
Specifically, the Treasury identifies many elements necessary for a debt
instrument to qualify as a covered bond. 84
As a guide for a fledgling market, the Treasury has adopted particular features of European covered bonds that helped the European market
to grow. 85 Most importantly, the depository institution that issues covered bonds must retain that cover pool on its balance sheet, unlike the
MBS where mortgages are packaged, securitized and sold off to investors. Covered bond holders must also have full recourse to the cover
pool and the issuer’s assets. 86 Taking another cue from the European
special-law framework, the Treasury advises that the interest on covered
bonds not be paid from mortgage income, as in the MBS structure, but
rather from the issuer’s general cash flows. 87
Additionally, issuances of covered bonds are limited to 4% of the
issuer’s liabilities, inclusive of the bonds, and set strict requirements
regarding which type of collateral is eligible to be part of the cover
assets. 88 The collateral securing covered bonds must consist of, among
79. See Hillary Johnson, Why Covered Bonds May Fail, FIN. WEEK, Aug. 11, 2008,
available at http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080811/REG/
456415429.
80. See id.
81. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Covered Bond Policy Statement, Final
Statement of Policy (July 15, 2008) [hereinafter FDIC Press Release], available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08060a.html.
82. See TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 6.
83. See id. at 3.
84. See id. at 7-8.
85. See id. at 6.
86. See id. at 7-8.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 15 (explaining that this is done so that the FDIC, the Treasury, and
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other requirements: performing first-lien mortgages, underwritten at the
fully-indexed rate 89 with documented income and a maximum Loan-toValue ratio (“LTV”) of 80% 90 and one-to-four family residential properties, in which the covered bond holders must have a perfected security interest. 91 The mortgages must also be current on the date of inclusion in the cover pool, and the issuer must replace any mortgages that
become more than 60-days past due. 92 This stands in contrast to the
MBS structure in which the underlying mortgages remain in each MBS
until maturity. The Treasury granted some leniency, however, in acceptance of eligible collateral by providing that covered bonds may be secured by a limited volume of AAA-rated mortgage securities and certain
substitution collateral such as cash and Treasury and agency securities,
on the condition that limited volume not exceed 10% of eligible collateral. 93 Moreover, the Treasury specifies that maturity for covered
bonds must be between one year and thirty years, and that issuers must
overcollateralize 94 the cover assets in excess of the notional value of the
other regulators could evaluate the development of the covered bond market).
89. See id. at 19 (“The fully indexed rate equals the index rate prevailing at origination plus the margin to be added to it after the expiration of an introductory interest
rate.”).
90. The issuer must update the LTV based on the most recent valuation of the
underlying assets. See id. at 12; Kothari, supra note 66 (“If the LTV is found to be
more than 80%, only 80% of the value of the property will be considered for counting
the size of the pool. In other words, the excess of the outstanding loan amount over
80% of the value of the property will be ignored for the purpose of counting the pool
value.”).
91. TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 11-12.
92. See id. at 12.
93. See id. at 12-14.
94. Issuers of covered bonds can perhaps earn interest on excess spread within
covered bond funding transactions to alleviate the burden of holding extra collateral.
Excess spread is the difference between the weighted average interest rate of the underlying loans that a financial institution receives from mortgage borrowers and the
weighted average funding cost of the transaction in the form of coupon payments to
covered bond investors. The funding cost of the transaction should be less than the
weighted average rate of the underlying loans. Fabozzi & Kothari, supra note 12.
Because a covered bond transaction is a secured financing deal and covered bond payments are disbursed from an issuer’s cash flow instead of the underlying mortgage payments, a covered bond issuing SPE should structure interest payments earned on the excess spread to the issuing bank. Although excess spread is commonly used to absorb
expected losses from the asset pool, the issuing bank is nonetheless under an obligation
to replace non-performing assets, diminishing the benefit of a SPE retaining the excess
spread.
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covered bonds by at least 5% of the outstanding principal balance at all
times. 95
Moreover, the issuer must appoint an independent Asset Monitor,
such as a rating agency or some other entity of that capability, to perform a monthly Asset Coverage Test to ensure collateral quality and the
proper level of overcollateralization, to determine whether any cover
pool asset substitutions are necessary and to report this documented information to investors. 96 For disclosure, the Treasury recommends
looking to Regulation AB 97 for guidance on supplying investors with
descriptive information on the asset pool. 98
The Best Practices Guide also specifies that a depository institution
may issue covered bonds under one of two proposals: it can issue covered bonds directly, including through its wholly-owned subsidiary
(“direct-issuance structure”), or through a bankruptcy-remote SPE
created for the purpose of issuing covered bonds (“SPE-issuance
structure”). 99 If the depository institution or its subsidiary directly
issues covered bonds, the bank designates a dynamic mortgage pool of
95. See TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 11-12; Kothari, supra
note 66 (“The asset cover or pool value . . . should at least be 105% of the outstanding
bond liabilities at any time.”).
96. TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 14. In addition, aside
from rating the quality of the cover assets, a covered bond transaction shines a spotlight
on the credit quality of the financial institution. If the cover pool is insufficient to make
scheduled payments to covered bond holders, those holders have recourse to the issuer’s
assets. From the investors’ perspective, “as long as the bank is solvent, they are really
looking to the bank to pay the obligation on the covered bonds. They’re not looking to
the cover pool.” John Arnholz et al., Covered Bonds: Shelter from the Storm?, ASSET
SECURITIZATION REP. ROUNDTABLE, May 26, 2008, at 12, 16-17 [hereinafter ASR
REPORT], available at http://www.mckeenelson.com/files/Publication/aa07bcfc-2ef7-4c
c2-a2e0-021fcdb1a4f2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b96095b8-0468-4651-befc042b6c3eaeb2/11.pdf (statement of Roundtable participant Prue Larocca, Managing
Dir., RBS Greenwich Capital). Consequently, overuse of covered bond obligations
could hurt issuer ratings, as the rating agencies could deem the issuers oversubscribed
with obligations, which ultimately could hinder the issuing banks’ ability to obtain other
debt funding and thus deter unsecured investors. See Al Yoon, Covered Bonds Won’t
Replace Securitization – BofA, REUTERS, Feb. 8, 2008, available at http://uk.reuters.
com/article/marketsNewsUS/idUKN0846274820080208; see also Yair Listokin, Is
Secured Debt Used to Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An
Empirical Analysis, 57 DUKE L.J. 1037, 1047-48 (1981) (discussing drawbacks of
secured debt).
97. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1100-.1123 (2005).
98. TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 14.
99. See id. at 11, 17-18.
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revolving mortgage loans on its balance sheet that secures the mortgage
bonds and that ultimately backs the covered bonds. 100 Under the SPEissuance structure, the SPE must purchase mortgage bonds from the
depository institution, and must secure the mortgage bonds against a
dynamic pool of residential mortgages. 101 The SPE then issues covered
bonds backed by assets in the cover pool to investors.102 In both
structures, however, the covered bond holders have a first-priority claim
on the cover assets. 103 In addition, the cover pool will always remain on
the balance sheets of depository institutions, regardless of the covered
bond issuance structure. 104
In view of the dynamic nature of the cover pool, prepayment of
loans does not affect investors because new assets will be substituted into the cover pool. 105 An important issue arises, however, regarding covered bond holders’ protection against prepayment risk in case of issuer
default. The SPE-issuance structure is primarily designed to protect
covered bond holders against such prepayment risk if the originating
depository institution defaults; 106 it is also intended to enable the FDIC
to access potential excess residual collateral over the limit necessary to
protect covered bond holders. 107 It is possible that the SPE-issuance
structure, which was used in the previously mentioned Bank of America
and Washington Mutual U.S. covered bond transactions, 108 can benefit
covered bond holders in case of issuer default by retaining elements of
securitization while capitalizing on the advantages of a covered bond
structure. 109 This may be accomplished through asset segregation,
which involves creation of a bankruptcy-remote SPE and swap

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Kothari, supra note 66.
See Chris Ginieczki, The Issuer’s Perspective–USA, in EUROPEAN COVERED
BOND FACTBOOK, 219, 219 (2d ed. 2007).
107. ASR REPORT, supra note 97, at 15 (statement of Roundtable participant
Michael Krimminger, Special Advisor, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.).
108. Id.
109. True sale, however, while an important benefit of securitization, is lost in a
covered bond transaction because the presence of a recourse obligation defeats the point
of transferring the risks and rewards of the assets to investors. A covered bond issuance
clearly reflects a financing transaction between the depository institution and the SPE.
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arrangements with a Specified Investment Contract Provider, as
described below. 110
The depository institution makes the SPE bankruptcy-remote by
restricting the SPE’s activities in as many ways as possible. Primarily,
this is done by appointing independent directors whose consent is required for the SPE to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition, limiting the
amount of debt an SPE can have, limiting the number of creditors and
employees so they are not able to put the SPE into involuntary bankruptcy, observing all appropriate arms-length third-party formalities with
the originator, and adopting provisions in the articles of organization
prohibiting asset sale, merger, consolidation, dissolution and liquidation. 111 The result is that the SPE-issuance structure creates a separate
trust dealing exclusively with covered bond issuances. Bankruptcyremoteness ensures that even if the issuing bank defaults, the SPE will
continue functioning as intended.
Despite the creation of a bankruptcy-remote SPE, investors may
remain wary of the treatment of their covered bonds in case of default,
with particular focus on acceleration of their covered bond investments.
If an issuing depository institution defaults, the cover pool along with
the issuer’s remaining balance sheet assets transfer under FDIC control.
The FDIC may then enter into a conservatorship 112 or a receivership 113
role and will try to transfer the defaulted issuer’s operations to a buyer
that will assume its obligations. In those roles, the FDIC has three
options regarding covered bond transactions of that depository institution: 114
(1) Continue to perform on the depository institution’s covered
bond contracts;

110.
111.
112.

TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 13.
Gorton & Souleles, supra note 37.
A form of bankruptcy whereby the FDIC steps in to take care of financial and
legal matters of the defaulting institution. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Act § 11(c)-(d), 12
U.S.C. § 1821(c)-(d) (2008) (describing the appointment, functions, and powers of an
FDIC conservatorship).
113. A court order whereby all the property subject to dispute in a legal action is
placed under the care of a disinterested party, in this case the FDIC, whose goal is to
preserve the defaulting institution’s property from adverse claims. See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1296-97 (8th ed. 2004); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)-(d) (describing the
appointment, functions, and powers of an FDIC receivership).
114. See TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 16.
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(2) Use cash to pay off the covered bonds up to the value of the
pledged collateral; or
(3) Permit liquidation of the pledged collateral to pay off the
covered bonds. 115
Even if the issuing institution enters insolvency proceedings, it is
far from certain that covered bond obligations will be accelerated because the FDIC may choose the first option. If the FDIC selects either
of the latter two options, covered bond holders may be at some risk of
non-payment from the FDIC’s exercise of an automatic stay over the
defaulting institution’s assets. 116 The covered bond holder, however, obtains direct access to the cover pool ten days after the FDIC’s appointment as conservator or receiver through the FDIC’s automatic consent if
the depository institution taken over by the FDIC remains in monetary
default and the covered bond holder provides written request to exercise
his contractual remedies. 117
In the event that the FDIC does not wish to continue performance
on the defaulted issuer’s covered bond obligations and repudiates the
covered bond contract, the Treasury, as a precaution, advises that the
SPE must enter into a Specified Investment Contract through a swap
arrangement, in which “[f]ollowing a payment default by the issuer or
repudiation by the FDIC as conservator or receiver, the Specified Investment should pay ongoing scheduled interest and principal payments so
long as the Specified Investment Provider receives proceeds of the
Cover Pool assets at least equal to the par value of the Covered
Bonds.” 118 Therefore, even if the depository institution defaults, the
Specified Investment Contract continues the arrangement between the
issuer and the covered bond holders; the covered bond holders receive
scheduled payments from the proceeds of the Cover Pool instead of the
institution’s cash flows. Nevertheless, it is still possible that the liquidation proceeds of the covered bonds may be insufficient to reimburse the
covered bond holders or the Specified Investment Provider. This problem can be cured, however, through another swap agreement with a third
115.
116.
117.

Id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).
Such remedies may include liquidation of the pledged collateral. TREASURY
BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 32-33; see FDIC Press Release, supra note
82. In contrast, European law only provides two options in case of issuer’s insolvency:
government bailout or liquidation. See ASR REPORT, supra note 97, at 13 (statement of
Roundtable participant Michael Krimminger, Special Advisor, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.).
118. See TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 13.
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party. The third party, who could be the Specified Investment Provider
or another market participant, will agree to compensate the covered
bond holders for the deficiency in exchange for a certain sum, which
could be part of the overcollateralization percentage. In any event, if the
covered bonds repay investors less than the principal and accrued
interest owed, investors can preserve an unsecured claim on the issuer’s
other assets ranking pari passu, or equal, with other unsecured investors. 119 In essence, the cover pool achieves securitization’s goal of
avoiding substantive consolidation during bankruptcy, since the cover
pool assets may not be combined with assets destined for unsecured
creditors in the event of default.
Another potential source of apprehension is a lack of guidance as to
how the FDIC will transfer covered bond liabilities to a buyer in case of
issuer default. This concern has been somewhat ameliorated, however,
by the September 2008 bankruptcy filing of Washington Mutual, one of
the two previous issuers of covered bonds in the U.S. 120 When the FDIC
was named receiver of Washington Mutual, following the closure it
transferred to JPMorgan Chase & Co. all deposits, assets and certain
liabilities of the failed institution. 121 The FDIC kept Washington
Mutual’s covered bonds separate from its other liabilities and passed
them in their entirety to JPMorgan Chase & Co., which assumed all obligations of the covered bonds. 122 Nevertheless, Washington Mutual
was very fortunate to find a buyer that assumed its covered bond obligations, 123 and investors remain nervous about what would happen if the
FDIC could not find such a purchaser. 124
119.
120.

See id. at 7.
WASHINGTON MUT. INC. BANKR. NEWS (Bankr. Creditors’ Serv., Inc., Fairless
Hills, P.A.), Sept. 29, 2008, available at http://bankrupt.com/wamunews.txt.
121. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Information for Claimants in
Washington Mutual Bank (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news
/press/2008/pr08085b.html.
122. Id.
123. Al Yoon, WaMu Covered Bonds Rally, Pass Key Investor Test, REUTERS, Sept.
26, 2008, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/governmentFilingsNews/idINN26307
54720080926 (“Covered bonds issued by Washington Mutual Inc[.] jumped . . . after
U.S. regulators affirmed the supporting assets would be assumed by JPMorgan Chase &
Co, easing investor doubts of how the securities may be treated in a bank insolvency.”).
124. The concern is that if banks are not able to pay their covered bonds obligations,
the taxpayer is ultimately liable for covered bond obligations if the FDIC decides to
save a large covered bond issuer. Peter Coy, Are Covered Bonds a Safe Way to Finance
Mortgages? Not Likely, BUS. WEEK, July 30, 2008, at 25 available at http://www.
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III. 1940 ACT EXEMPTIONS FOR PUBLIC ISSUERS OF COVERED BONDS
It has been a long-standing principle of securities laws that regulation is necessary to counteract the latent industry abuses that arise when
persons or companies manage assets other than their own. 125 The
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) promulgated the 1940
Act as part of a broad effort to enact federal securities legislation during
the 1930s to curb gaming of the financial system and mandate disclosure
to investors. 126
The broad reach of the 1940 Act does not overlook issuance structures built around SPEs. Under the 1940 Act, most securitizations are
viewed as “investment companies” 127 and thus must comply with its imposed regulatory scheme. Investment companies are subject to intense
federal oversight and compliance with the 1940 Act is typically very
expensive and onerous. 128 In fact, its provisions are so burdensome for
businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_32/b4095000911375.htm (“[C]overed bonds
wouldn’t reduce risk as much as transfer it from bond buyers to the U.S. taxpayer.”).
The FDIC could potentially extinguish its own internal insurance fund not for the advantage of bank depositors, its intended beneficiaries, but for the benefit of covered
bond investors. See id.; Johnson, supra note 80; Coy, supra note 125. It is also possible, however, that because of overcollateralization or some other variable the value of
the pledge collateral for covered bonds is greater than the total amount of all valid
claims held by the covered bond holders. TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra
note 16, at 16. In that case, the excess amount belongs to the FDIC and serves as an
addition to its insurance fund.
125. See Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism, 94 HARV. L. REV.
561 (1981).
126. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ ET AL., SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND
CAPITAL MARKETS 129 (2004).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (2004) (“Investment company” is defined in pertinent
part as an issuer of securities that either “is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading
in securities; is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount
certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such business and has any
such certificate outstanding; or is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of
investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to
acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 percentum of the value of
such issuer’s total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an
unconsolidated basis.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (broadly defining “security”
to include notes, stocks, bonds, evidences of indebtedness, investment contracts, and
“any interest of instrument commonly known as a ‘security’”).
128. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (prohibitions or restrictions on issuing debt
securities); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10, 80a-16 (restrictions and limits on the composition of
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SPEs that securitization structures strive to find exemptions from
investment company status so as to rid themselves of the compelled
oversight. In theory, because SPE-issuance covered bond financing
structures resemble securitization, issuers of covered bonds would not be
excused from complying with the 1940 Act and its accompanying burdens without specific exemptions.
Attorneys in securitizations rely primarily on one proviso in the
1940 Act to exempt public offerings of structured financings from its
burdens: Rule 3a-7. 129 Hypothetically, attorneys involved in covered
bond issuances could also attempt to use this exemption to escape the
1940 Act. The inherent structure of covered bonds, however, could
potentially disqualify issuers of this asset class from using this exemption. Therefore, covered bond issuers would be left with little choice but
to use a different exemption, most likely Section 3(c)(5)(C) of the 1940
Act, 130 which is not tailored specifically for structured financings, or to
attempt an expansion of the applicability of Rule 3a-7 to include covered
bonds. 131 While using Section 3(c)(5)(C) might be acceptable for now,
since covered bonds in the U.S. are restricted to residential mortgages,
expansion of Rule 3a-7 is more favorable to the future development of
covered bonds should it expand to other asset classes because it eliminates exemptions based on asset classifications. 132
A. Rule 3a-7
In November of 1992, the SEC issued Rule 3a-7 with the primary
purpose of exempting nearly all SPEs involved in securitizations from
the board of directors); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-13, 80a-15(a) (requirements of shareholder
votes for certain issues); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30 (continuing reporting and disclosure
requirements).
129. 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (1992).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5).
131. Besides Section 3(c)(5) and Rule 3a-7 exemptions, the 1940 Act contains other
exemptions from “investment company” status for issuers in public offerings. They are
not as favorable, however, for securitization structures. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b),
-3(c)(3), -3(c)(4), -3(c)(6). Other exemptions from “investment company” status apply
to private, not public, offerings. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), -3(c)(7). If no
statutory exemption is available, an SPE can petition the SEC under Sections 3(b)(2)
and 6 of the 1940 Act to issue an order exempting the SPE from registering as an
“investment company,” although there is no guarantee that the SEC will grant one. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(b)(2), -6(c) (1996).
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5)(A)-(C).
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the definition of “investment company” as long as they meet certain criteria. 133 This rule exempts most structured financings currently used in
the capital markets for all sectors of the economy, not just the mortgage
segment.
Rule 3a-7 provides that an SPE that purchases or otherwise holds
receivables will not fall within the definition of “investment company” if
it complies with the following four conditions:
(1) the SPE issues securities whose payment depends primarily
on the cash flow from “eligible assets;”
(2) the securities issued must be high-rated (investment-grade or
better) by at least one nationally-recognized rating agency
(in addition to other regulation exemptions for private offerings);
(3) the SPE does not buy or sell the receivables unless it is within the terms of the agreements pursuant to which the SPE’s
securities are issued, and not “for the primary purpose of
recognizing gains or decreasing losses resulting from market
value changes;” and
(4) unless the SPE issues securities that are not exempt from
registration with the SEC under Section 3(a)(3) of the 1933
Act, the SPE must appoint an independent trustee for those
securities. 134
Currently, for purposes of Rule 3a-7, the SEC defines “eligible
assets” as “financial assets, either fixed or revolving, which by their
terms convert into cash within a finite time period plus any rights or
other assets designed to assure the servicing or timely distribution of
proceeds to security holders.” 135 By their nature, covered bonds fall
within this definition: upon maturity covered bond investors are reimbursed their investment in cash and may keep all interim interest payments. The SEC acknowledged that the scope of the definition of
“eligible assets” may not encompass all types of assets that can be
securitized as of the rule’s release date and that the definition may be
expanded. 136
133. Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Company for Structured
Financings, 1940 Act Release No. 19,105, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 85,062, 57 Fed. Reg. 56248 (Nov. 27, 1992) [hereinafter Rule 3a-7 Release].
134. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7.
135. 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7(b)(1).
136. Rule 3a-7 Release, supra note 134.
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Satisfaction of the first condition, however, is still potentially problematic for issuers of covered bonds. Payments to covered bond investtors do not come out of the underlying assets but arise out of the issuer’s
general cash flows. 137 Ultimately, covered bond payments have little to
do with the cash flows from the actual cover pool. The cover assets are
held on the issuer’s balance sheet as collateral to provide recourse in
case of default, not for the purpose of relaying their cash streams to covered bond holders. 138 Since covered bond structures cannot comply with
the first requirement of Rule 3a-7, this nonconformity effectively disqualifies Rule 3a-7 as an exemption from the 1940 Act for covered bond
issuers.
Neither the text of Rule 3a-7 nor the comments to its release provide guidance as to what percentage of required payments must be covered by cash flows from these eligible assets to satisfy the “primarily”
requirement. Shifting focus to another aspect of a possible exclusion
from “investment company” status leads to an examination of the SEC’s
intent in forming the relationship between payments and cash flows
from eligible assets. The SEC’s Investment Company Act Rule 3a-7
release (“Rule 3a-7 Release”) states that “[t]he provision tying payments
to cash flows is intended to include payments obtained in any manner
other than from the market value or fair value of the eligible assets.”139
The Rule 3a-7 Release thus indicates that payments from cash collateral
accounts and proceeds from credit enhancements constitute “cash flow
from eligible assets.” 140 A covered bond originator retains cover assets
on its balance sheet and the issuing SPE pays investors out of the originnator’s general cash flows for the purpose, in part, of providing a credit
enhancement to its covered bonds. Thus, it may be logical to conclude
that these general cash flow payments to investors also constitute “cash
flow from eligible assets.” Furthermore, since the payments on covered
bond obligations come from the issuer’s general cash flows, covered
bond payments do not depend on the market value or fair value of the
underlying assets.
A conceivably advantageous approach to adapting Rule 3a-7 for
exempting covered bond issuances would be to clarify this indication to
specifically mention covered bonds and qualify that payments in relation
137. TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 7. In a securitization, the
investors receive payments from the cash flows of the underlying assets.
138. See id.
139. Rule 3a-7 Release, supra note 134, at n.17.
140. Id. at Part II.A.2(i).
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to covered bonds satisfy the “primarily” requirement despite not being
dependent on the underlying receivables. Such a method would provide
certainty to the developing covered bond market and relieve the concerns of would-be covered bond issuers that are wary of the burdens imposed by the 1940 Act.
B. Section 3(c)(5)(C)
Section 3(c)(5) of the 1940 Act has long been a fundamental exemption provision applicable to certain securitization transactions. Prior
to the adoption of Rule 3a-7, Section 3(c)(5) was the primary avenue for
exempting issuers of structured financings from “investment company”
status. Even after Rule 3a-7’s implementation, however, Section 3(c)(5)
remains available as an exemption from registration under the 1940 Act
for issuers of certain recognized types of assets. Among Section 3(c)(5)
exemptions, Section 3(c)(5)(C) is the most relevant for covered bonds,
as the Treasury recommended that the development of the market should
be confined to residential mortgages. 141 Section 3(c)(5)(C) excludes
from the definition of “investment company” entities not issuing
“redeemable securities” 142 and that are “primarily engaged” 143 in “pur141.
142.

See TREASURY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 16, at 6.
A “redeemable security” is “any security, other than short-term paper, under
the terms of which the holder, upon its presentation to the issuer or to a person designnated by the issuer, is entitled (whether absolutely or only out of surplus) to receive
approximately his proportionate share of the issuer’s current net assets, or the cash
equivalent thereof.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(32) (2006). The SEC has previously stated
that securities would not be considered “redeemable” where significant restrictions are
placed on the terms of their redemption. See Redwood Mortgage Investors VII, SEC
No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 285819 (Jan. 5, 1990) (minimum one-year holding period,
limitations on the source of funds for liquidation payments, and limitations on the
aggregate amount of liquidation payments in any twelve-month period if an investor
wanted to redeem).
143. The SEC generally interprets “primarily engaged” to mean that at least 55% of
the issuer’s assets must consist of real estate fee interests and/or loans secured exclusively by real estate. See NAB Asset Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176787
(June 20, 1991). Additionally, at least 25% of issuer’s assets must be invested in real
estate-type interests (subject to reduction to the extent that the issuer invests more than
55% of its total assets into real estate fee interests and/or loans secured exclusively by
real estate), and the remainder, no more than 20% of the issuer’s assets may consist of
miscellaneous investments, such as cash, cash equivalents, and any other non-real estate
related asset. See Greenwich Capital Acceptance, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991
WL 177011 (Aug. 8, 1991).
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chasing or otherwise acquiring mortgages and other liens on and interests in real estate.” 144
Similar to a securitized mortgage issuance, a covered bond issuance
would satisfy Section 3(c)(5)(C) requirements. In a typical securitization transaction, the issuer cannot redeem the interests in receivables
sold to investors. Nor could it do so in a covered bond transaction. In
addition, an SPE is typically created to handle one particular securitization, such as of mortgage receivables, and so satisfies the “primarily
engaged” requirement. Feasibly, an SPE in a covered bond issuance
would be subject to the same limitation and would satisfy the “primarily
engaged” provision.
CONCLUSION
The releases of the Best Practices Guide and the Policy Statement
are appropriate initial steps in forming a U.S. covered bond market.
Both take cues from the UCITS Directive guidelines as to maintaining a
dynamic cover pool, clear identification of cover assets on the issuer’s
balance sheet, recourse to the cover pool and the issuer in case of default, and mandatory asset monitoring and disclosure provisions. They
avoid certain aspects of already-developed covered bond frameworks –
the €1 billion requirement of the Benchmark Covered Bond Model and
the CRD risk weighting benefits – for the sake of growing a covered
bond market in the U.S.
Covered bonds can certainly be created with other high-quality
cash-flow producing types of collateral, such as credit card receivables
or municipal debt, but “when you start a market you always try to start
small.” 145 Moreover, the Treasury and the FDIC did not address the
actual mechanics of a covered bond transaction, such as bond pricing
and yield. 146 Instead, they would prefer market participants to decide
such factors through dynamic aspects of supply and demand, although

144.
145.

15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5)(C).
ASR REPORT, supra note 97, at 18 (statement of Roundtable participant Prue
Larocca, Managing Dir., RBS Greenwich Capital); see Heidi Crebo-Rediker & Douglas
Rediker, Commentary, Covered Bonds Can Rebuild America, FORBES, July 28, 2008,
available at http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/28/covered-bonds-infrastructure-oped-cx_
hcr_dr_0728bonds.html.
146. See Johnson, supra note 80.
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they recommended using swap agreements to mitigate market uncertainties such as currency and interest rate risks.147
The potential lack of the Rule 3a-7 exemption from the 1940 Act
does not indicate that covered bond issuances will be subject to the 1940
Act. Covered bond issuers in public offerings will still benefit from the
Section 3(c)(5)(C) exemption because they are likely to satisfy its conditions. Looking forward, if the covered bond market expands beyond
residential mortgages, Section 3(c)(5) is confined by artificial asset class
distinctions in treatment under the 1940 Act. 148 Rule 3a-7 standardizes
the exemption by shifting the focus from whether a specific type of asset
falls within the exclusion to whether the issuance form is that of structured financing. Therefore, Rule 3a-7 proves more beneficial should the
covered bond market grow, mature and expand to assets beyond the
applicability of Section 3(c)(5) and should be qualified specifically to
include covered bond issuances.
As a result of the government’s commitment to developing the covered bond market, banks in the U.S. will be amenable to issuing covered
bonds, since they provide significant benefits in the form of high credit
ratings and lower cost of funding as compared to senior, unsecured
corporate debt of the issuer. 149 Given time and effort, the covered bond
market will grow as investors’ appetite for risk abates and they seek
cover in safer issuances that provide recourse to the originator.

147. Because the presence of recourse guarantees less risk, covered bonds should
yield less than securitized assets and so their spreads should be lower.
148. Section 3(c)(5)(A) excludes entities that are “primarily engaged” in acquiring
common types of receivables used in securitizations, such as student loans, credit card
receivables and auto loan receivables. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5)(A). Section 3(c)(5)(B)
refers to loans to manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers and to prospective purchasers of
specified merchandise, insurance and service. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5)(B).
149. See Bond Basics, supra note 21 (in many European cases, covered bonds carry
ratings even higher than those of the issuers); see also Packer et al., supra note 40, at
51.

